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Abstract
In this paper I analyze the e⁄ect of the transparency of the decision making process
in committees on the decisions that are eventually taken. I focus on committees whose
members are motivated by career concerns, so that each member tries to enhance his own
reputation. When the decision making process is secretive, the individual votes of the com-
mittee members are not exposed to the public but only the ￿nal decision. Thus, individuals
are evaluated according to the group￿ s decision. I ￿nd that in such a case, group members
are induced to comply with preexisting biases. For example, if the voting rule demands
a supermajority to accept a reform, individuals vote more often against reforms and ex-
acerbate the conservatism of the voting rule. When the decision making process becomes
transparent and individual votes are observed, this e⁄ect disappears and such committees
are then more likely to accept reforms. I also ￿nd that coupled with the right voting rule,
a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many economic and political decisions are taken by groups of decision makers, i.e., by
committees. Company boards, governments and monetary policy committees are some
notable examples. Such decision making bodies, however, seem to be going through a
process of becoming more transparent. In particular, it is only a recent phenomenon that
the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee’s minutes or the deliberations of the US
Supreme Court Justices are published. Although the views of individuals members of the
European Central Bank and the EU Court of Justice are still hidden from the public eye, the
trend is undoubtedly in the direction of more transparency. This trend is casually connected
with more openness and more ‘democratization’. In this paper I investigate the eﬀect of
transparency on the behaviour of committee members, and hence, on decision making in
committees.
My analysis focuses on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns.
Committee members such as members of governments, monetary committees or multi-
judicial courts, are indeed likely to be concerned about their own promotion, re-election
or prestige. Although by now we have a relatively good understanding of how individual
decision makers behave when they are motivated by career concerns,1 we are still lacking an
analysis of group decision making when the individuals members of the group have career
concerns. I therefore study the interaction of these reputation concerns with the decision
process - be it transparent or secretive.
In the model, I assume that to advance his career, each committee member wishes to
accumulate reputation for being a high ability decision maker. Namely, that he has accurate
private information about the matter to be decided. Obviously then, in a transparent
procedure, when votes of the individual members of the committee can be observed, they
can be used strategically by the committee members to aﬀect their reputation and career
path. I show how reputation concerns induce committee members to vote strategically even
when the procedure is secretive, i.e., when their individual votes are not observed by those
they wish to impress.
The main result is that when the decision process in a committee is secretive, then com-
mittee members conform to preexisting biases in the decision making process. In particular,
1The large literature following Holmström (1982) spans many types of decision makers (such as managers,
ﬁnancial advisers, politicians etc.) in a plethora of environments.
1when the voting rule is biased against some decision so that it demands a supermajority in
order to accept it, then individual votes are biased against this decision as well. Similarly,
if the voting rule is unbiased but the prior expectation is, committee members tend to vote
for the action that is favored by the prior. This implies that when a committee becomes
transparent, it is more likely to accept reforms or radical decisions. I also show that trans-
parency is not always optimal, and that in some environments, a secretive committee that
uses a particular voting rule makes better decisions on average.
To understand the intuition for the above ﬁndings, consider a secretive committee, so
that outside evaluators can observe only the ﬁnal decision. Suppose that the voting rule
demands unanimity to change the status quo. If the committee does accept a reform, then
these outsiders can perfectly learn that all individuals supported the reform. It therefore
becomes analogous to a transparent procedure.
On the other hand, if the status quo is maintained, it is harder to extract information
about individual votes. Maintaining the status quo is therefore a "noisier" decision. In the
presence of such uncertainty about individual votes, two conﬂicting eﬀects arise compared
with a transparent mechanism. If the committee’s decision is wrong, an individual expert
can gain utility by shedding the blame on others and "claiming" that his vote was correct.
On the other hand, an expert can also lose utility since he forgoes being recognized as the
one who made the right recommendation, as evaluators may suspect that he voted in the
wrong way. I show that for the marginal types (who are the less able types) the utility
gain is larger; this arises since on average, experts are perceived to vote in the right way
and are then more likely to be able to shed the blame than to be losing recognition. Thus,
compared with a transparent mechanism, more types of experts would vote for the status
quo (i.e., experts would align their vote with the inherent bias of the voting rule).
To see why transparency is not always optimal, note that careerist experts have a
tendency to vote too much against the decision that the prior beliefs indicates to be the
right one. This proves that their own information is more accurate than that represented
by the prior. In fact, when the prior is very strong, such a distortion arises in all decision
making procedures. But among the procedures considered, a secretive committee coupled
with a voting rule that is biased in favor of the prior has a two-fold advantage. First, for
any behavior of the experts, the decision favored by the prior is most likely to be accepted
with this voting rule. Second, in the secretive mechanism, individual votes conform to the
2bias in the voting rule and thus experts least distort their votes in this case.
My paper identiﬁes therefore a "conformity" eﬀect which is completely diﬀerent from
what previous literature on group decision making has found. In papers by Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1997), Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Persico (2004) and Austen-Smith and
Feddersen (2003), the assumption is that agents only care about the decision and not about
their career. These papers ﬁnd then the opposite eﬀect, that agents actually vote more
often for the decision that the voting rule is biased against.
Other papers do assume that committee members care about their career but none
identiﬁes the "conformity" eﬀect. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2000) model a transparent voting
processes. Since it is transparent, their model is strategically equivalent to an individual
decision making process and no strategic group eﬀects arise. Visser and Swank (2005) model
a secretive voting process and assume that talented experts receive the same perfect signals,
and thus, as in Scharfstein and Stein (1990), experts wish to convince the evaluator that
they have voted in the same way.
More closely related are Gersbach and Hahn (2001), Fingleton and Raith (2005),
Stasavage (2004) and Sibert (2003), who focus directly on the comparison between secre-
tive and transparent mechanisms. They all show that secrecy may induce better decisions
because it reduces the incentives of an individual to distort her actions in order to signal
her type.2 I show however that there are still strong incentives for signalling even in the
secretive case, and that these incentives depend on the voting rule. In particular, secretive
procedures can be better when coupled with the right voting rule and otherwise, they can
be worse.
More speciﬁcally, Gersbach and Hahn (2001) analyse a two-period model in which all
or some committee members can be replaced after the ﬁrst period. In the equilibrium
they discuss, uninformed types mimic informed types when the process is transparent but
abstain when the process is secretive. They therefore isolate an inter-temporal trade-oﬀ
between transparency (which allows for better selection of committee members after the ﬁrst
period) and secrecy (which allows for better decisions in the ﬁrst period). In the context of
bargaining, Fingleton and Raith (2005) show that while open door negotiations can allow
employers to learn more information about their agents, such practice is also ineﬃcient
2The same intuition arises in papers by Prat (2004) and Avery and Meyer (2003) for the case of individual
decision makers.
3since agents bid more aggressively (relative to closed-door negotiations). Stasavage (2004)
assumes that agents care about acquiring a reputation for having some particular ideology
(in my analysis, agents acquire reputation for being able experts) and that agents also
care directly about the decision of the committee.3 He concludes that secrecy is sometimes
better; what drives this result is the interplay between career concerns and decision concerns
(see Section 6.2). In my analysis, secretive procedures may be better even when agents do
not care about the decision itself.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I describe the model.
Section 3 presents the equilibrium for the transparent case and section 4 analyses the equi-
librium for the secretive case. In section 5, I present the main result which compares
decision making in committees under the diﬀerent procedures. I analyse some extensions
and conclude in Section 6. The appendix has all proofs that are not in the text.
2 The Model
I describe now the decision making process in a committee. I make some simplifying as-
sumptions to facilitate the analysis. First, I analyse the smallest size of a committee which
can yield interesting results in terms of diﬀerent voting rules, that is, a three member com-
mittee (the results, as can be seen from the proofs and the general intuition, can be extended
to larger committees). Second, I focus the analysis on agents with career concerns only.
The results are robust when we assume that experts are also genuinely interested in the
committee’s decision on top of their career concerns (see section 6.2).
Consider therefore a three-member committee that needs to decide between two alter-
natives, A and B. Each member i, i ∈ {1,2,3}, receives information on a random variable
wi ∈ {ai,b i}. Each of these random variables could be interpreted as determining a di-
mension of the problem, for example, a diﬀerent criterion according to which A and B are
evaluated.
Ia s s u m eﬁrst that these dimensions are not correlated, i.e., that the w0
is are indepen-
dently distributed. I do so for exposition purposes since it allows me to isolate the diﬀerent
eﬀects arising due to career concerns (the results are robust when we introduce correlation,
see section 6.1). It is also a reasonable assumption in the context of committees. Com-
mittees (compared with individuals) allow for division of labor, so that each expert can
3These are also the assumptions in Sibert (2003).
4focus on a diﬀerent aspect of the problem. This is the case for example in committees in
which members represent diﬀerent business units in the same company, or in governments
in which each minister holds a diﬀerent portfolio. Thus, although extreme, the assump-
tion of no correlation captures the environments in which there is a relatively low level of
correlation between the diﬀerent dimensions.
I assume therefore that the prior probability is Pr(wi = bi)=qi. To make the model
tractable, let qi = q>1
2 for all i. Also, each expert i receives a signal si ∈ {ai,b i}, such that
Pr(si = wi|wi)=ti. Each expert i knows ti, whereas all others know that ti is uniformly
distributed on [.5,1]. The talent of an expert is therefore measured by ti; t h em o r et a l e n t e d
is expert i, the more accurate is his information. Thus, given the prior and his private
signal, each expert can update his posterior probability about his state of the world:





qti+(1−q)(1−ti) if si = b;
(1−q)ti
q(1−ti)+(1−q)ti if si = a.
(1)
where Pr(wi = b|q,si,t i)=1− Pr(wi = a|q,si,t i).
All members vote simultaneously and their vote/message is denoted by mi ∈ {a,b},
which therefore indicates whether they support A or B. A voting rule is denoted by x ∈
{1,2,3}. Av o t i n gr u l ex implies that if { i|mi = a} ≥ x, then the committee decides for A.
When x =3 , t h ev o t i n gr u l ei sA-unanimity, i.e., all need to approve A for it to be accepted.
When x =2 , t h ev o t i n gr u l ei smajority and when x =1 , t h ev o t i n gr u l ei sB-unanimity.
Denote the decision of the committee by d ∈ {A,B}.
An additional agent is the evaluator, denoted by E. If the committee is formed of
politicians, the evaluator can represent the public who assesses how competent is each
politician. If the committee is composed of diﬀerent unit managers in the ﬁrm, the evaluator
can represent the shareholders, who decide whom to promote.
The evaluator updates his beliefs about ti for each expert i, given the uniform prior
on each. To simplify the analysis, I assume that E observes wi, after the decision had
been taken, for all i (the results hold also when E observes each state only with some
probability). In addition, E observes the decision d and knows the voting rule x. Finally,
if the committee’s meeting is transparent, he also observes the votes mi for i ∈ {1,2,3}. If
the committee’s decision making process is secretive, then E does not observe mi.4
4The eﬀects described in my analysis also arise if in the secretive case E observes with some probability
the vote conﬁguration, that is, how many experts vote for A or for B.
5As usual in career concerns models, I don’t attribute any utility function to the evalu-
ator but simply assume that he rationally updates his beliefs. This can be derived from a
motivation to promote the most able experts. Denote the posterior expectations that the
evaluator has on the type ti of expert i by τi. I assume that each expert’s objective is to
maximize E(τi).
In equilibrium, the evaluator’s beliefs about the experts’ strategies are correct and his
updating process relies on Bayes rule whenever possible. Also, each experts chooses the vote
which maximizes E(τi), given his own information, E0s beliefs, and the strategies of other
experts. I focus on informative equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which each expert’s votes are
sometimes responsive to their signals, and ignore ‘mirror’ equilibria in which the meaning
of the signals is reversed.
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. The states wi for i ∈ {1,2,3} are realized and each expert i learns si ∈ {a,b}.
2. Each expert sends mi ∈ {a,b}, given {q,si,t i}.
3. The decision of the committee is d = A if { i|mi = a} ≥ x and d = B otherwise.
4. E updates beliefs on ti for all i, given the decision of the committee d, wi for all i,
and if the mechanism is transparent, also mi for all i.
3 Transparent committees
Suppose ﬁrst that the evaluator observes the personal recommendation of each expert, i.e.,
the voting mechanism is transparent. In that case, the evaluator would only assess the
talent of expert i based on mi - the recommendation of expert i,a n dwi -t h er e l e v a n ts t a t e
of the world for expert i. In particular, the committee’s decision d, the voting rule x, and
the behaviour of other experts are of no consequence for the assessment of the evaluator and
hence do not aﬀect the equilibrium behaviour of expert i. Thus, each expert accumulates
individual reputation in the transparent mechanism. To solve for the equilibrium, we can
then focus on a generic expert and follow previous literature on individual career concerns
(thus, for the remainder of this section, I drop the index i).5
It is easy to establish that in any informative equilibrium, an expert uses a cutoﬀ point
strategy. Let v(q,s,t) ≡ Pr(w = a|q,s,t) where Pr(w = a|q,s,t) is deﬁned in (1). Thus, in
equilibrium, an expert recommends a if and only if v(q,s,t) ≥ v(q,s∗,t ∗). This cutoﬀ does
5See for example Levy (2004), Trueman (1994).
6not depend on x and is denoted in short by v∗(q).
The evaluator E, using Bayesian updating, forms his expectations τv(m,w) about the
ability of the expert, given some conjecture of the expert’s strategy of a cutoﬀ point v,a n d
the observations of m and w. Thus, for example, τv(a,a) denotes the posterior expectations
over the type t of the agent when m = a and w = a and E conjectures the cutoﬀ v, τv(b,a)
is the reputation of the expert when m = b and w = a, and so on. In equilibrium, the
conjecture of E about v has to be correct.
We now have all the ingredients necessary for solving for the equilibrium cutoﬀ.I n
equilibrium, the type v∗(q),t h a ti s ,t h et y p e(s∗,t ∗) for which Pr(w = a|q,s∗,t ∗)=v∗(q),
must be indiﬀerent between recommending b or a. The following equation has therefore to
hold:
v∗(q)τv∗(a,a)+( 1− v∗(q))τv∗(a,b)=v∗(q)τv∗(b,a)+( 1− v∗(q))τv∗(b,b) ⇔
v∗(q)(τv∗(a,a) − τv∗(b,a)) = (1 − v∗(q))(τv∗(b,b) − τv∗(a,b)) (2)
The equilibrium is characterized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 There is a unique informative equilibrium in which: (i) each expert i
recommends mi = b if v(q,si,t i) ≤ v∗(q) < 1
2, and recommends mi = a otherwise; (ii) for
each expert, τv∗(a,a) ≥ τv∗(b,b) >τ v∗(a,b) ≥ τv∗(b,a); (iii) for all q, each expert votes for
each decision, A or B, with an ex ante probability that is bounded away from zero.
The ﬁrst observation is that an informative equilibrium exists even though the expert
only cares for his reputation and does not haveag e n u i n ei n t e r e s ti nt h ed e c i s i o ni t s e l f .
The reason is that in an informative equilibrium, an expert is indeed rewarded with higher
reputation for making the correct recommendation. Thus, he has an interest to make a
good use of his private signal.
A second observation is that v∗(q) < 1
2 which implies that each expert would sometimes
vote for A although he believes that B is the right decision. The reason is, as stated in
part (ii) of the Proposition, that the expert is rewarded - in reputation terms - when he
contradicts the prior and recommends for A. This increases reputation since it ‘proves’ that
the expert’s own private information is rather accurate, or at least, more accurate than the
prior.
Moreover, as shown in Levy (2004), this incentive to go against the prior implies that
the interval of types who vote for A does not shrink to zero measure with q (i.e., even if
7the prior is heavily biased towards B). In other words, it is not only the extremely able
who vote for A. Such a strategy cannot be sustained in equilibrium since in that case, the
reputation from voting for A would exceed that from voting for B even if the vote for A
turns out to be the wrong vote. But this would provide an incentive for types of lesser
ability to deviate and vote for A, a contradiction.
Finally, note that since all experts behave in the same way in equilibrium, a transparent
process implies that the committee accepts A more often when x is smaller, and that each
decision, A or B, is accepted by the committee with an ex ante probability that is bounded
away from zero.
4 Secretive committees
We now consider the case in which the decision making process in the committee is non-
transparent, that is, E does not observe the individual votes. B u tn o t et h a tt h ee v a l u a t o r
does observe the decision of the committee, d, which allows him to extract some information
about individual votes. Thus, each expert becomes now - indirectly - interested in the
decision d. This also implies that each expert’s equilibrium behaviour would depend on the
voting rule x and on other experts’ behaviour. As opposed to the transparent case, the
committee’s decision making process creates therefore a strategic interaction between its
members.
To further the analysis, I impose the following. First, as usual in strategic voting games,
I focus only on the interesting equilibria in which experts do not use weakly dominated
strategies. In other words, they vote as if they are pivotal. Second, since the experts are
ex ante symmetric, I analyse the symmetric equilibrium in which all experts use the same
strategy.
We can now analyse the equilibrium. As in the transparent case, each expert would
use a unique cutoﬀ point. Denote the cutoﬀ point as a function of the voting rule by vx(q).
Recall that we have deﬁned τv(mi,w i); this is the reputation of expert i given a message
mi, the state wi, and the conjecture of the evaluator about some cutoﬀ v. This was a useful
tool in the analysis of the transparent case, in which the evaluator observes mi. But it is still
useful: In the secretive case, the evaluator would simply form some beliefs regarding what
expert i had recommended. In other words, given some group decision d, an expert knows
that he is perceived to have voted a with some probability (and hence have reputation of
8τv(a,wi)), and to have voted b in the remaining probability (and hence have reputation of
τv(b,wi)).
In o wd e ﬁne these probabilities. Let αv(d,wi,x) denote the expected probability, from
the point of view of expert i, that the evaluator would believe that mi = a for expert i,
given the decision d,h i ss t a t ewi, the voting rule x and some conjecture of a cutoﬀ strategy
v for all members. This expected probability also depends on the beliefs of i on the other
agents’ states, i.e., wj and wh for j,h 6= i. For clarity of exposition, I suppress these indices
which are not important for the main argument.6
Thus, αv(A,a,x) is the probability with which expert i is perceived to have recom-
mended a, given the decision d = A and wi = a. Similarly, αv(B,a,x) is the probability
with which expert i is perceived to have recommended a, given the decision d = B and
wi = a, and so on. For example, it is easy to see that for the unanimity rules x =3and
x =1respectively, αv(A,wi,3) = 1 and αv(B,wi,1) = 0.
In equilibrium, an expert votes as if he is pivotal. The equilibrium condition, given
some voting rule x, has to equate the expected utility of expert i from d = A and from
d = B precisely at the cutoﬀ point vx(q). Recall that vx(q) denotes the belief of the expert
that the state is a. The equilibrium condition is therefore:
vx(q)(αvx(A,a,x)τvx(a,a)+( 1− αvx(A,a,x))τvx(b,a)) (3)
+(1 − vx(q))(αvx(A,b,x)τvx(a,b)+( 1− αvx(A,b,x))τvx(b,b))
=vx(q)(αvx(B,a,x)τvx(a,a)+( 1− αvx(B,a,x))τvx(b,a))
+(1 − vx(q))(αvx(B,b,x)τvx(a,b)+( 1− αvx(B,b,x))τvx(b,b))
The next result characterizes the equilibrium in the secretive mechanism:
Proposition 2 For any voting rule x ∈ {1,2,3}, there exists a unique symmetric
e q u i l i b r i u mw i t hac u t o ﬀ vx(q) such that each expert i votes mi = a if v(q,si,t i) ≥ vx(q)
and mi = b otherwise. For all q and x, the ex ante probability that any action A or B is
taken, is bounded away from zero.
The equilibrium in the secretive mechanism maintains the same features of that in the
transparent mechanism. For example, as in the transparent case, it cannot an equilibrium
phenomenon that only the extremely able vote for A and thus also types of mediocre ability
6See the proof of Lemma 1.
9vote for A (even if the prior is heavily biased towards B). We are now ready to compare
between the diﬀerent decision making procedures.
5 Transparency and Reputation
In this section I show how secretive and transparent committees tend to make diﬀerent
decisions. I show that a secretive procedure exacerbates preexisting biases. If the voting
rule is biased against an action, committee members tend to vote more often against this
action. Similarly, if the voting rule is unbiased but the prior expectation is, committee
members tend to vote for the action that is favored by the prior. I also show that this
"conforming" behavior is sometimes more eﬃcient than the behaviour in the transparent
procedure. To proceed, I ﬁrst prove a simple but a useful Lemma.
5.1 A useful lemma
Bayesian updating implies that in any equilibrium, given any state wi,e x p e r ti is perceived
as more likely to have recommended a when the decision of the committee is A, and that
given any decision of the committee, expert i is perceived as more likely to have recommend
a when his state is a:
Lemma 1 For any cutoﬀ point v and voting rule x: (i) αv(A,a,x) ≥ αv(B,a,x) and
αv(A,b,x) ≥ αv(B,b,x); (ii) αv(A,a,x) ≥ αv(A,b,x) and αv(B,a,x) ≥ αv(B,b,x).
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider an expert i and let wjh = {wj,w h} for j,h 6= i denote
the vector of states of the world for the other experts. The expert knows that E would
know wjh and hence for each state wjh, can construct α
wjh
v (d,wi,x). When i is pivotal, he
knows that there must be x−1 votes of a, and 2−(x−1) votes of b,f o rx ∈ {1,2,3}. This







Note however that Pr(wjh|piv,x,v) does not depend neither on d nor on wi. Thus, to
prove the Lemma, it is suﬃcient to prove that for any wjh,α
wjh









v (A,a,x) ≥ α
wjh
v (A,b,x) and α
wjh
v (B,a,x) ≥ α
wjh
v (B,b,x).
W h e nt h ev o t i n gr u l ei sx, the probability that the group makes the decision A given
10that expert i recommends a or b is:
da ≡ Pr(d = A|mi = a,x,wjh,v)=
2 X
l=x−1
Pr(exactly l experts recommend a|wjh,v) (4)
db ≡ Pr(d = A|mi = b,x,wjh,v)=
2 X
l=x












mwi(1 − da)+( 1− mwi)(1 − db)
.
where mwi =P r ( mi = a|wi,v). However, it is easy to see from (4) and (5) that da >d b for
any wjh. This, with (6), implies that α
wjh
v (A,a,x) ≥ α
wjh





v (B,b,x). Moreover, since the equilibrium is informative, then ma >m b. From (6), it
then follows that α
wjh
v (B,a,x) ≥ α
wjh
v (B,b,x) and α
wjh
v (A,a,x) ≥ α
wjh
v (A,b,x).¤
5.2 The "conformity" eﬀect
Using Lemma 1, I now analyse how the decisions of the committee diﬀer when the procedure
is transparent and when it is secretive. To compare between these procedures, consider the
equilibrium cutoﬀ point of the transparent case, v∗(q). Let us now conjecture that in the
secretive case, this cutoﬀ point v∗(q) is the equilibrium cutoﬀ point as well. And to start,
suppose that the voting rule is A−unanimity (x =3 ) .
When x =3 , if the committee’s decision is A, it allows the evaluator to perfectly learn
that each expert voted A. Thus, given our equilibrium conjecture v∗(q), the expected utility
from voting for A, for an expert of any talent, is equal in the transparent procedure and in
the secretive procedure. On the other hand, if the committee decides for B, there is some
uncertainty regarding individual votes in the secretive procedure. In that case, given the
equilibrium conjecture, the expected utility from voting for B diﬀers in the transparent and
in the secretive procedures. Speciﬁcally, consider the expert at the cutoﬀ point (who believes
that his state is a with probability v∗(q)). In the transparent mechanism, his expected utility
from voting b is:
v∗(q)τv∗(b,a)) + (1 − v∗(q))τv∗(b,b), (7)
11whereas at the secretive mechanism, the expected utility from voting b is:
v∗(q)(αv∗(B,a,3)τv∗(a,a)+( 1− αv∗(B,a,3))τv∗(b,a)) (8)
+(1 − v∗(q))(αv∗(B,b,3)τv∗(a,b)+( 1− αv∗(B,b,3))τv∗(b,b)).
Subtract (7) from (8), to get:
αv∗(B,a,x)[v∗(q)(τv∗(a,a)−τv∗(b,a))]−αv∗(B,b,x)[(1−v∗(q))(τv∗(b,b)−τv∗(a,b))]. (9)
T h u s ,f o rt h ee x p e r ta tv∗(q), t h ee x p r e s s i o ni n( 9 )d e s c r i bes how his utility changes
when he votes for B and the procedure switches from transparent to secretive. To ﬁnd the
sign of (9), let us ignore the α terms for a moment. The ﬁrst term of (9), [v∗(q)(τv∗(a,a)−
τv∗(b,a))], represents a gain in utility terms when the mechanism becomes secretive. In that
case, when the committee decides B, but when the correct state of the expert is actually a
(which happens with probability v∗(q)), the expert is not to be fully blamed for this wrong
decision, since the evaluator may think that he have voted for A.
On the other hand, the second term in (9), −[(1−v∗(q))(τv∗(b,b)−τv∗(a,b))], represents
a utility loss when the mechanism becomes secretive. If the decision B of the committee is
actually correct (which happens with probability 1−v∗(q)), t h ee x p e r ti sn o tf u l l yr e w a r d e d
from voting for the correct decision, since the evaluator believes that he might have actually
voted for A.
However, recall that v∗(q) is the equilibrium cutoﬀ point in the transparent case. There-
fore, by (2), these two terms - the reputational gain of not being fully blamed and the
reputational loss from not being fully rewarded - are equal. To ﬁnd the sign of (9) we there-
fore have to consider the probabilities with which the expert will get the reputational gain
or the reputational loss, and in fact, these are diﬀerent. The expert gets the reputational
gain, compared with the transparent case, when the decision is B, his state is a, and he is
perceived as voting for A. On the other hand, he incurs a reputational loss compared with
the transparent case when the decision is B, his state is b, but he is perceived as voting for
A.B yL e m m a1 ,
αv(B,a,x) >α v(B,b,x)
which implies that the expert is more likely to incur a reputational gain than a loss when
the mechanism becomes secretive. Thus, for all q, t h ee x p r e s s i o ni n( 9 )i sp o s i t i v e .
12We have therefore established that given the equilibrium conjecture v∗(q), the expected
utility of the expert at the cutoﬀ v∗(q) from voting for A i st h es a m ei nb o t hp r o c e d u r e s
whereas that from voting for B is higher in the secretive case compared with the transparent
case. Moreover, in the transparent case, the expected utility of the expert at v∗(q) from
voting for A and from voting for B must be equal, since v∗(q) is indeed the equilibrium
cutoﬀ point. These two observations imply that in the secretive mechanism, the expert at
v∗(q) would rather vote for B than vote for A. Along with equilibrium uniqueness, we can
then conclude that v∗(q) <v 3(q).7 Thus, when x =3 , experts vote more often for B in the
secretive procedure than in the transparent procedure.
At a more basic level, the intuition for the above result is as follows. Since the voting
rule is biased against A, a decision of A reveals relatively precise information to the evaluator
about an individual’s vote. A decision of B on the other hand reveals little information
and hence allows individuals to garble their recommendations. The able types wish that
their type is revealed and hence would like to provide as much information as possible to
the evaluator about their vote. However, when we compare between procedures, it is the
marginal types - the less able ones - who make the diﬀerence. These types actually prefer
as little information as possible to be revealed about their type and hence about their vote,
and thus rather vote for the "noisier" decision.
W h e nt h ev o t i n gr u l ei sx =1 , we therefore get a similar result. This voting rule is
also biased, this time towards A, and hence experts are induced to vote more often for A, so
that v1(q) <v ∗(q). More generally, and according with the intuition described above, the
more a voting rule is biased against an action, the more often an individual votes against
this action in the secretive process, i.e., v1(q) <v 2(q) <v 3(q) for any q.
It remains to compare the behaviour of experts in the secretive and in the transparent
mechanism when the voting rule is the unbiased simple majority rule. Let x =2 , and
think ﬁrst of q = 1
2. In this case, given the fully symmetric model, the evaluator’s possible
assessments are the same when d = A and when d = B. Since there is no diﬀerential learning
from the group’s decision, the model becomes analogous to the transparent one and hence
when q = 1
2, v∗(q)=v2(q).
7This result depends not only on equilibrium uniqueness but also on the fact that the expected utility of
an expert at the cutoﬀ point from voting for A(B) increases(decreases) when the cutoﬀ point increases, as
I show in the proofs.
13However, when the prior points towards to B as the likely state, this ‘breaks’ the
symmetry. In particular, it is ex ante more likely that experts vote for B (since their signals
are informative and their strategies are responsive to the signals). But then if a group
decision of B proved to be the wrong decision from the point of view of some expert i, this
expert can "blame" others for voting for B. As above, he is more likely to gain utility by
shedding the blame on others than to lose utility from not being fully recognized as the
one who made the correct recommendation. This induces agents to recommend for B more
often in the secretive mechanism, so that v∗(q) <v 2(q). We therefore establish that:
Proposition 3 (i) v1(q) <v 2(q) <v 3(q); (ii) v1(q) <v ∗(q) <v 3(q), and for high
enough values of q, also v∗(q) <v 2(q).8
Both the prior q and the voting rule x serve as sources of bias in the secretive case
and individual votes conform to these biases. The voting rule is a procedural bias, such as
a constitutional law which requires that any change to an existing law can be approved by
a supermajority of the votes. This "status quo bias" is diminished once votes are observed.
The prior creates another bias, of beliefs. When votes are observed however, experts would
vote more often against the popular views or public opinions. Corollary 1 summarizes the
implications of Proposition 3 for decision making in committees:
Corollary 1 (Reputation, voting rules and transparency):
(i) When the mechanism changes from secretive to transparent, the committee accepts
more often the decision that the voting rule is biased against.
( i i )W h e nt h ev o t i n gr u l ei sm a j o r i t yr u l e ,and the mechanism changes from secretive
to transparent, the committee accepts more often the decision that goes against the initial
prior belief when the prior is suﬃciently high.
(iii) When the committee changes its voting rule to a higher x, the probability that B
is accepted increases more in the secretive than in the transparent mechanism.
5.3 Optimal decision making procedures
I have described several decision making procedures which diﬀer on two aspects, the voting
rule and the level of transparency. I now use the results of the previous sections to shed
some light on the question of which procedure induces committees to make decisions in the
8Analytically I can show that v
∗(q) <v
2(q) only for high values of q but I have also checked numerically
that v
∗(q) <v
2(q) for all other values of q.
14most eﬃcient manner.
A natural criterion for eﬃciency is the (aggregate) probability that the decision is
correct on all dimensions. Since all dimensions are ex ante symmetric, it is enough though
to look at one dimension only. We therefore search for the procedure that maximizes
qPr(d = B|v,x)+( 1− q)Pr(d = A|v,x) where v ∈ {v∗(q),vx(q)}, i.e., v depends on the
voting rule and on the level of transparency.
To gain some intuition about which procedure allows for more eﬃcient decision making,
recall that it cannot be an equilibrium phenomenon that only the extremely able vote for A.
If this would arise in equilibrium, then voting for A would be a very precise and favourable
signal about talent which would create an incentive for all other types to vote for A as well,
a contradiction. Thus, both in the transparent and in the secretive mechanism and for all
levels of q and for all x, also experts of mediocre talent vote for A. But when q is high (so
that B is probably the right action), this means that experts vote ineﬃciently too often for
A, in all procedures. To ﬁnd the best (constrained) optimal mechanism, we therefore have
to identify the one which induces the smallest such distortion.9
There are two possible tools that can somewhat mitigate this distortion. First, for a
ﬁxed cutoﬀ point, it is best to choose the voting rule which reduces the probability that
the committee decides for A (that is, x =3 ) . Similarly, for some ﬁxed voting rule, it is
best to choose the transparency level which allows for the highest cutoﬀ point (i.e., the one
associated with an equilibrium in which experts vote more often for B). We have to be
cautious since the voting rule also aﬀects the cutoﬀ p o i n ts ot h e s et w ot o o l sm i g h tc r e a t e
conﬂicting eﬀects. By Proposition 3 however, in the secretive case, these two eﬀects go in
the same direction; the A−unanimity voting rule indeed induces the highest cutoﬀ point
among all possible procedures. We therefore have:
Proposition 4 There exists q0, such that for all q>q 0, the optimal committee decision
making procedure is secretive and has x =3 .
Note that even when q is high, it is still optimal, depending on its members’ infor-
mation, that the committee sometimes decides for A. However, since all procedures induce




the secretive case, when x =2or when x =3 , and the prior q is low, this might be reversed; it is still the
case that mediocre types vote for A but it is not necessarily ineﬃcient. Assessing which procedure is the
most eﬃcient is therefore not as clear cut as in the case of high levels of q.
15the committee to decide for A too often, the secretive A − unanimity procedure is (con-
strained) optimal as, relative to other procedures, it induces the highest probability that
the committee decides for B.
Given the discussion above, it is easy to see that the secretive procedure with x =1
is actually the worst mechanism for suﬃciently high q. Thus, we cannot simply conclude
that "secretive procedures" or "transparent procedures" are better, but we have to take
into consideration the voting rule as well.
The normative analysis is somewhat restrictive; I have focused only on the eﬃciency
of current decisions while diﬀerent procedures also allow evaluators to learn diﬀerently
about the ability of the committee members, which may have implications for promotion of
committee members and hence the eﬃciency of future decisions. Moreover, I discuss below
some extensions of the model, in which I allow for experts to care directly about the decision,
and for correlation in the private information of the experts. These two possibilities can
also be taken into account in a richer mechanism design analysis. For example, one can
consider what should be the division of labor in the committee, or whether to provide direct
incentives for committee members to take the right decision. Thus, in future research, it
might be fruitful to investigate all these possibilities in a more nuanced welfare analysis.
6 Discussion
I conclude by discussing some extensions of the model, which illustrate the robustness of
the results as well as introduce some possibilities for future research.
6.1 Correlated information
In the model, committee members have private information on aspects of the decision which
are assumed to be independently distributed. This assumption allows me to distinguish the
"conformity" eﬀect, i.e., that experts exacerbate existing procedural biases in the secretive
mechanism. When the states are correlated however, another eﬀect arises. Consider the
A-unanimity rule (x =3 ) . When an expert is pivotal, he realizes that the state a is more
likely since the two other experts have voted for A. Since correct recommendations enhance
reputation, the expert is encouraged, under this voting rule, to vote a. Thus, this eﬀect
works in the opposite direction compared with the "conformity" eﬀect.10
10In related models, this eﬀect arises when agents care for the decision per se (see Austen-Smith and
Banks (1996) or Federssen and Pesendorfer (1997)). In my model it arises because career concerns also
16I now analyse the case of correlation to consider this additional "pivotal" eﬀect. Assume
that with probability λ, wi = w for all i. The common state w can take the two values a
or b where Pr(w = b)=q, and experts receive conditionally independent signals about
w according to their talent, as above. With probability 1 − λ, each state wi is drawn
independently as in the original model. Note then that for all λ, nothing changes in the
transparent procedure and all experts use the cutoﬀ point v∗(q). I can then show:
Proposition 5 There exists λ
−
, ¯ λ ∈ (0,1) with λ
−
≤ ¯ λ, such that the results of Proposi-
tion 3 hold for all λ ≤ λ
−
whereas for all λ>¯ λ, v3(q) <v 2(q) ≤ v∗(q) <v 1(q).
To see the intuition, note ﬁr s tt h a tf o ra l lλ, the "conformity" still exists. It is also the
dominant eﬀect for low levels of λ, insuring the robustness of the previous results. However,
when λ increases, this eﬀect becomes weaker; experts are expected to vote in a similar way
when their information is correlated. It therefore becomes harder to "claim" that others
are to blame for a wrong decision. Moreover, the "pivotal" eﬀect becomes stronger with a
higher degree of correlation and thus becomes dominant for a high enough λ. In these cases,
secretive committees are more likely to actually accept than to reject reforms.
The behavior of committee members may depend therefore on the interaction between
voting procedures and the degree of correlation between their private information. In some
environments it might be possible to control this degree of correlation. As illustrated above,
this can therefore be another tool in the design of optimal committee procedures.
6.2 Decision concerns
In this section I show how the results are robust to the introduction of an assumption that
experts are genuinely concerned for the committee to take the ‘right’ decision. Speciﬁcally,
assume that each expert gains utility when the decision of the committee accords with his
state of the world and to ﬁx ideas, let expert i maximize τi + θIi, where θ>0 and Ii =1
if d = wi and Ii =0otherwise.
Note that decisions concerns are manifested diﬀerently in the secretive and in the
transparent case. In the secretive mechanism, an expert assesses the eﬀect of his recom-
mendation on both his reputation and the committee’s decision, only in the event in which
he is pivotal. In the transparent case, the expert’s recommendation still matters for the
decision only when he is pivotal but matters for his reputation in any event. This implies
induce agents to try and make the correct decision since this results in higher reputation.
17that decision concerns are relatively weaker when the procedure is transparent.11 As I show,
this additional consideration does not aﬀect the results when θ is suﬃciently low.
Recall that in the transparent case experts bias their vote against the prior; they vote
for A even when they believe that the state of the world is more likely to be b. This distortion
remains however for all (ﬁnite) values of θ. Thus, for all voting rules, the marginal expert
at the transparent cutoﬀ point believes that the state b is more likely. Therefore, upon
a switch to a secretive mechanism, stronger decision concerns induce this marginal expert
to vote for B. But in the cases of x =3and x =2such expert is induced to vote for B
even in the absence of decision concerns. Decision concerns can only strengthen the result
in these cases. When x =1on the other hand, a switch to a secretive procedure in the
absence of decision concerns induced experts to vote more often for A and hence too strong
decision concerns, which create the opposite incentive, might oﬀset this. We therefore have
the following robustness result (note that the transparent cutoﬀ points are sensitive now to
the voting rule x and are thereby denoted by v∗
x)):
Proposition 6 For all θ,v 1(q,θ) <v 2(q,θ) <v 3(q,θ) in secretive committees, where
v∗
3(q,θ) <v 3(q,θ), and for high enough q also v∗
2(q,θ) <v 2(q,θ). When θ is suﬃciently
low, v1(q,θ) <v ∗
1(q,θ).
6.3 Discussion of other assumptions
In the model I have made several simplifying assumptions, most of which are not important.
I have assumed that committee members vote simultaneously. A sequential process however
would yield the same results. To see that, note that either the procedure is transparent
in which case others’ vote is meaningless (and hence also the order of the vote), or the
procedure is secretive in which case one’s vote only matters when he is pivotal and an
expert’s strategy in this case is the same when the vote is sequential or simultaneous.
The assumptions about binary states, binary signals about the states, or continuous
signals about the experts’ talents all do not matter for the results and the analysis carries
through with alternative assumptions. The assumption that the prior distribution over
each expert’s types is uniform is also not crucial as Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 hold for
any prior distribution function. The uniform assumption simpliﬁes the analysis when we
11This intuition drives the result in Stasavage (2004) who shows that a secretive mechanism may be more
eﬃcient.
18consider equilibrium uniqueness in the secretive case.
Ih a v ec o n s i d e r e das y m m e t r i cc a s ei nw h i ch experts are ex ante homogenous. This
assumption is not important in terms of the qualitative results. If for example one agent
is known to have better talent ex ante (for example, the prior distribution over his types
ﬁrst order stochastically dominates that of the others), then in equilibrium he will use a
diﬀerent cutoﬀ point than others. Still, the cutoﬀ points will change between the secretive
and the transparent case in the same manner as in the model since Lemma 1 holds for any
prior distribution.
Another symmetry assumption, about the prior being the same on all dimensions, was
made for tractability. This assumption does not matter when we consider the unanimity
rules. When we consider the unbiased majority rule, the results can be easily modiﬁed when
the priors diﬀer. For example, experts would tend to vote more often for B under majority
rule in the secretive mechanism, as derived here, if the joint prior distribution over other
experts’ states places a high enough probability on both states being b.
Finally, there are two possible alternative assumptions regarding the preferences of the
experts. I have assumed that experts are risk neutral. All the results would hold if the
experts maximize instead some function V (τ) for V (·) which is either concave or not too
convex. In the case of an extremely convex utility function (an extreme risk-loving agent),
however, the results may be reversed. For example, when x =3 , an expert in the secretive
mechanism would have incentives to vote for A, relative to the transparent case. Voting for
A allows him to receive the highest possible reputation (that of voting correctly against the
prior) whereas voting for B can never result in such reputation since the evaluator cannot
assert for sure that the expert voted A.12
I have also assumed that experts are interested in proving their ability. In some con-
texts, committee members might want to create a reputation for having some particular
preferences (for example, preferences which accord with the ideology of the evaluator). A
reasonable conjecture is that under this alternative assumption, agents in secretive commit-
tees would tend to vote more with their own true preferences and cater less to the evaluator’s
preferences. In future research, it might therefore be interesting to combine both types of
reputation concerns, for expertise and for ideology.
12I thank a referee for pointing this out.
196.4 Concluding remarks
I have shown that the transparency of the decision making process has important conse-
quences when committee members have career concerns. In particular, transparent com-
mittees tend to vote more often for the decision that is disadvantaged by institutional
biases, such as the voting rule, or by public opinion biases, such as the prior. Moreover, the
analysis illustrates that optimal committee design needs to take into account not only the
transparency of the process but also the voting rule. That is, secretive procedures may be
better than transparent ones when coupled with the right voting rule, and otherwise they
may be worse.
I have abstracted in the model from the possibility that committee members exchange
their views prior to placing their votes. Attempting to inﬂuence the votes of other agents
is clearly an important feature of group decision making.13 Speciﬁcally, when such inter-
nal deliberation is unobserved by the evaluator, this may result in interesting interaction
between information aggregation and voting procedures. For example, if the actual vote is
also secretive, the less able experts may want to insure that the committee’s decision is the
one that reveals the least information about their type (for example, the decision that the
voting rule is biased in favour). The more able types might have the opposite incentive.
This internal conﬂict will constrain the possibility for truthful information exchange. If
the actual vote is transparent on the other hand, committee members may have a greater
incentive to transmit truthful information to one another, since no such endogenous con-
ﬂict is created regarding the committee’s decision. It might therefore be fruitful to explore
in future research the interaction between career concerns, transparency, and information
aggregation, in group decision making.
13For recent contributions, see Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2003) and Visser and Swank (2005).
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where Pr(wbb)=q2, Pr(wab)=P r ( wba)=q(1 − q) and Pr(waa)=( 1− q)2. Since wab and
wba are strategically equivalent, I therefore treat them as one state, wab, and assume that
this state occurs with probability 2q(1 − q). By Lemma 1, each element in the nominator
and the denominator is positive.
Recall that mwi ≡ Pr(mi = a|wi,t). For the diﬀerent voting rules, we can now derive
the expressions in (10) by using Bayesian updating:
Pr(piv|wjh,3,v)(α
wjh
v (A,wi,3) − αwjh(B,wi,3)) =

   






b)+(1−mwi)] for wjh = wbb
mamb[1 −
mwi(1−mbma)






a)+(1−mwi)] for wjh = waa

   




v (A,wi,2) − αwjh(B,wi,2)) =

   




















a)] for wjh = waa

   
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,
for K = ma(1 − mb)+mb(1 − ma), and:
Pr(piv|wjh,1,v)(α
wjh
v (A,wi,1) − αwjh(B,wi,1)) =

   
   
(1 − mb)2[
mwi
mwi+(1−mwi)(1−(1−mb)2)] for wjh = wbb
(1 − ma)(1 − mb)[
mwi
mwi+(1−mwi)(1−(1−mb)(1−ma))] for wjh = wab
(1 − ma)2[
mwi
mwi+(1−mwi)(1−(1−ma)2)] for wjh = waa

   
   
.





(1−q)(1−t)+qt. I sometimes refer to v as the generic cutoﬀ point and sometimes
to t (and then specify whether s = a or s = b). Note that when the cutoﬀ point has s = a,
then ma =
R 1
t 2zdz =1−t2 and mb =
R 1
t 2(1−z)dz =( 1−t)2 for some cutoﬀ point t, with
ma >m b. Finally, let Γ(s,t;q,x) ≡
αv(A,b,x)−αv(B,b,x)
αv(A,a,x)−αv(B,a,x).
21I now prove three technical Lemmas.































Proof: These inequalities hold since ma >m b. For example, consider x =1and the
















All the other inequalities are similarly derived.¤
Lemma A2: For all x, Γ(s,t;q,x) increases in q.
































































But all these hold by Lemma A1 and thus Γ(s,t;q,x) increases in q.¤
Lemma A3: Γ(a,t;q,x) decreases in t and Γ(b,t;q,x) increases in t.
I show here one of the cases, when x =3and s = a. The other cases are proved in
t h es a m ew a y .T oc o n s t r u c tt h ed e r i v a t i v eo fΓ(a,t;q,3), we need the following (note that
ma =1− t2, mb =( 1− t)2, ∂mb












































































∂t < 0. Thus, the deriv-




































for any wjh. Using the expressions derived above (which are functions of t only),ar o u t i n e
calculation establishes these three inequalities for any t ∈ [.5,1].¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :See Levy (2004). The main argument involves the following:
(i) when the cutoﬀ point has s = b(a), then τv(a,a) ≤ (≥)τv(b,b) and τv(a,b) ≤ (≥)τv(b,a)
and therefore for (2) to hold, the cutoﬀ point must admit s = a; (ii) If we conjecture that
in equilibrium s = a and t = q, then for this type, the expected utility from voting a is
higher than that from voting b a n dt h u sb yc o n t i n u i t ya ne q u i l i b r i u me x i s t s ; (iii) for any
conjecture of a cutoﬀ p o i n tt h a th a ss = a(b), the expected utility of an expert at the cutoﬀ
point from voting a increases(decreases) with t and from voting b decreases(increases) with
t. The equilibrium cutoﬀ is therefore unique and has s = a and t<q ;( i v )t h ec u t o ﬀ point
t is bounded by some ˆ t<1 for all q. Otherwise, if only the extremely able vote for a, we
would have that τv(b,a) ≤ τv(b,b) ≤ τv(a,b) ≤ τv(a,a) and thus (2) cannot hold. The
bound ˆ t is easily computed by ﬁnding the value of t which satisﬁes τv(b,b)=τv(a,b).¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :Re-arranging (3), the equilibrium condition becomes:
vx(q)(αvx(A,a,x) − αvx(B,a,x))(τvx(a,a) − τvx(b,a)) (12)
=(1− vx(q))(αvx(A,b,x) − αvx(B,b,x))(τvx(b,b) − τvx(a,b)).
By Lemma 1, αvx(A,a,x) − αvx(B,a,x) > 0 and αvx(A,b,x) − αvx(B,b,x) > 0 for all
q, x and some vx. Existence and the fact that the equilibrium cutoﬀ point tx is bounded
by ˆ t<1 follows then from the same arguments as in the transparent case. To see that the
equilibrium cutoﬀ point is unique, note that in the transparent case the expected utility
from voting a(b) increases (decreases) in t for s = a and the other way around for s = b.
By Lemma A3 this holds in the secretive case as well and thus the cutoﬀ is unique.
23Finally, note that when x =2and when x =3 , the cutoﬀ p o i n tm u s ta d m i tsx = a. For
x =3 , note that otherwise, by Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, the utility from voting b would
exceed that from voting a for all types with s = b, a contradiction. For x =2 , note ﬁrst that
Γ(s, 1
2; 1
2,2) = 1.14 But then Γ(b, 1
2;q,2) > 1 by Lemma A2 and Γ(b,t;q,2) > 1 by Lemma
A3. Now divide both sides of (12) by αvx(A,a,x) − αvx(B,a,x). In the transparent case,
the left-hand-side is smaller than the right-hand-side when s = b. Since Γ(b,t;q,2) > 1,t h i s
moreover holds in the secretive case and hence sx = b cannot be an equilibrium.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :I ﬁr s ts h o wp a r t( i i ) .T h ec a s eo fv∗(q) <v 3(q) is in the
text. To show that v1(q) <v ∗(q), I have to show that when the equilibrium conjecture is
v∗(q), then the expert at v∗(q) prefers to vote for A, i.e., that:
v∗(q)αv∗(A,a,1)(τv∗(a,a) − τv∗(b,a)) > (1 − v∗(q))αv∗(A,b,1)(τv∗(b,b) − τv∗(a,b)).
This holds by (2) and by Lemma 1. Similarly, to show that v∗(q) <v 2(q) for high
enough q, and given (2), it is enough to show that Γ(s∗,t ∗;q,2) > 1 when q is high enough.
By Proposition 1, the transparent cutoﬀ point has s = a and t<ˆ t. By Lemma A3,
Γ(a,t;q,x) decreases in t. Moreover, by Lemma A2, Γ(s,t;q,x) is monotone in q. Thus,
using continuity, it is enough to establish that Γ(a,ˆ t;1,2) > 1 which indeed holds.
To prove part (i) of the Proposition I use the same methodology. For that purpose,
I ﬁrst check that Γ(a, 1
2;1,1) < Γ(a,ˆ t; 1
2,2) and Γ(a, 1
2;1,2) < Γ(a,ˆ t; 1
2,3).B yL e m m aA 2
and Lemma A3, this implies that Γ(a,t;q,1) < Γ(a,t;q,2) < Γ(a,t;q,3) for t ≤ ˆ t. Note now
that for x =2and x =3 , as established in Proposition 2, the cutoﬀ point is at sx = a.
Thus v2 <v 3. If sx = a also for x =1then by the same reasoning we have v1 <v 2. If for
x =1we have the cutoﬀ point at sx = b, then moreover v1 <v 2.¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4 :Let λ = qmb +( 1− q)ma b et h ee xa n t ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a t
some expert votes for a. The probability that the committee’s decision is correct is therefore
q(1−mbλ2)+(1−q)(maλ2) if x =3 ,q ((1−λ)2mb+(1−mb)(1−λ2))+(1−q)(ma(1−(1−
λ)2)+(1−ma)λ2) if x =2and q((1−mb)(1 −λ)2)+( 1−q)(ma +(1−ma)(1 −(1 −λ)2))
if x =1 .
Note that by Propositions 1 and 2, for all q, ma,m b and λ are bounded from below by
14This is established by noting that ma =
3
4 =1−mb and substituting in (10). Moreover, this is intuitive
since in the fully symmetric case (q = .5,x=2and t = .5), the evaluator does not learn diﬀerent information
from a decision for A or a decision for B.
24some positive number. Given this observation, it is easy to see from the above expressions
that: (i) Fixing ma,m b and λ, then when q is high enough, x =3induces a higher probability
of a correct decision relative to x =1and x =2 ;(ii) For a high enough q, for any x,t h e
probability that the decision is correct decreases in (the bounded) ma,m b and λ. Finally,
note that ma,m b and λ depend only on v and thus Proposition 3 implies the result.¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5In the general case, the equilibrium condition can be simply
constructed in the following way:
(1 − λ)[vx(q)(αvx(A,a,x) − αvx(B,a,x))(τvx(a,a) − τvx(b,a))] (13)
+λ[V (q) · (αwaa
vx (A,a,x) − αwaa
vx (B,a,x))(τvx(a,a) − τvx(b,a))]
=(1− λ)[(1 − vx(q))(αvx(A,b,x) − αvx(B,b,x))(τvx(b,b) − τvx(a,b))]
+λ[(1 − V (q))(α
wbb
vx (A,b,x) − α
wbb
vx (B,b,x))(τvx(b,b) − τvx(a,b))]
where V (q)=
vx(q)Pr(piv|w = a,x,vx(q))
vx(q)Pr(piv|w = a,x,vx(q)) + (1 − vx(q))Pr(piv|w = b,x,vx(q))
.
Since the diﬀerences in the α probabilities do not vanish and do not depend on λ, the
results for λ =0hold for small values of λ and the results for λ =1hold for large values of
λ. I now show that when λ =1 ,v 3(q) <v 2(q) <v ∗(q) <v 1(q).
In the transparent case, in fact, the cutoﬀ point does not depend on λ and is the same
v∗(q) as described in Proposition 1. In the secretive case, the equilibrium condition is as
in (13), when we set λ =1 . As in the method of the proof of Proposition 3, to show that
v1(q) >v ∗(q), given the equilibrium condition (2), I have to show that:
Pr(piv|w = a,1,v∗(q))αwaa



































at v∗. This also holds whenever ma >m b and thus holds for any v. Finally, I have to show
that v2(q) <v ∗(q), or that
Pr(piv|w = a,1,v∗(q))(αwaa
v∗ (A,a,2) − αwaa
v∗ (B,a,2))
> Pr(piv|w = b,1,v∗(q))(α
wbb
v∗ (A,b,2) − α
wbb
v∗ (B,b,2))
⇔2ma(1 − ma)( 2−ma
3−2ma − ma
1+2ma) > 2mb(1 − mb)( 2−mb
3−2mb − mb
1+2mb).
25Substituting for ma =1− t2 and mb =( 1− t)2 (since s = a at v∗(q)), I ﬁnd that it
holds for all t ∈ [.5,1]. This establishes that v3(q) <v 2(q) <v ∗(q) <v 1(q) when λ =1 .¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6With decision concerns, in the case of a transparent process,
the equilibrium condition is:
v∗
x(q,θ)(τv∗(a,a) − τv∗(b,a)+P r ( piv|x,v∗)θ) (14)
=(1− v∗
x(q,θ))(τv∗(b,b) − τv∗(a,b)+P r ( piv|x,v∗)θ)





v∗(q,0), since: (i) For all q, a cutoﬀ point of 1
2 is the limit equilibrium when θ →∞ ; (ii)
Relative to the case of θ =0 , a positive value of θ implies that experts tend to make the
correct recommendation more often. Since v∗
x(q,θ) < 1
2, the correct decision is b.T h u s ,
v∗
x(q,θ) >v ∗(q,0);(iii) The greatest eﬀect of θ is when the expert is more likely to be pivotal.
Even though v∗
x(q,θ) < 1
2, it is still ex ante more likely that any other expert votes for B;
an expert is therefore more likely to be pivotal the lower is x. Thus, v∗
x(q,θ) decreases in x.
In the case of a secretive process, the equilibrium condition is:
vx(q,θ)[(αvx(A,a,x) − αvx(B,a,x))(τvx(a,a) − τvx(b,a)) + θ]
=(1− vx(q,θ))[(αvx(A,b,x) − αvx(B,b,x))(τvx(b,b) − τvx(a,b)) + θ]
The result that in secretive committees that v1(q,θ) <v 2(q,θ) <v 3(q,θ) is maintained
here since the decision concerns play the sa m er o l ei na l lv o t i n gr u l e sa n da r en o ta ﬀected
by the voting rule.
Fix x and consider the transparent cutoﬀ point v∗
x(q,θ). At this cutoﬀ point, in the
secretive process, an expert prefers to vote for B if (where I use the equality in (14)):
(αvx(A,b,x) − αvx(B,b,x) − (αvx(A,a,x) − αvx(B,a,x)))[(1 − v∗
x(q,θ)(τv∗(b,b) − τv∗(a,b))]
+(1 − 2v∗
x(q,θ))[1 − Pr(piv|x,v∗)(αvx(A,a,x) − αvx(B,a,x))]θ>0
Note that from Proposition 3 we know that the ﬁrst term is positive for x =3 , and for
x =2and high q. The second term is on the other hand positive for all x. Thus, the results
are maintained for all θ for x =3 , and for x =2and high q. For x =1 , we have to show
the reverse inequality. We know by Proposition 3 that the ﬁrst term is strictly negative for
all q. Thus, for a low enough θ the whole expression remains negative and the results hold
for x =1as well.¥
26References
[1] Avery, C. and M. Meyer (2003), “Designing Hiring and Promotion Procedures when
Evaluators are Biased”, mimeo.
[2] Austen-Smith, D. and J. Banks (1996), “Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the
Condorcet Jury Theorem”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 90 (1), pp. 34-45.
[3] Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2003), “Deliberation and Voting Rules”, mimeo.
[4] Feddersen, T. and W. Pesendorfer (1998), “Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of
Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting”, American Political Science Review,
Vol. 92(1), pp. 23-35.
[5] Fingleton, J. and M. Raith (2005), “Career Concerns of Bargainers”, Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization, Vol. 21 (1), pp. 179-204
[6] Gersbach, H. and H. Volker (2001), “Should the Individual Voting Records of Central
Bankers be Published?”. Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion paper 02/01.
[7] Holmström, B. (1982), “Managerial Incentives Problems: A Dynamic Perspective”, in
Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars Wahlbeck, Helsinki: Swedish
School Econ.
[8] Levy, G. (2004), “Anti-herding and Strategic Consultation.”, European Economic Re-
view, Vol. 48 (2004), pp. 503-525.
[9] Ottaviani, M. and P. Sørensen (2001), “Information Aggregation in Debate: Who
Should Speak First?”, Journal of Public Economics, pp. 393-421.
[10] Persico, N. (2004), “Committee Design with Endogenous Information”, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, Vol. 71(1), pp. 165-192.
[11] Prat, A. (2004), “The Wrong Kind of Transparency”, mimeo.
[12] Sibert, A. (2003), “Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputa-
tions”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 70 (3)pp. 649-665.
[13] Stasavage, D. (2004), “Public versus Private Deliberation in a Responsive Democracy”,
mimeo.
[14] Trueman, B. “Analyst Forecasts and Herding Behaviour.”, Review of Financial Studies,
Vol. 7 (1994), pp. 97-124.
[15] Visser, B. and O. Swank (2005), “On Committees of Experts”, Tinbergen Institute
Discussion Paper, TI 2005-028/1.
27